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CALVIN'S "SENSE OF DIVINITY" AND 
EXTERNALIST KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
David Reiter 
In this paper I explore and defend an interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of the sense 
of divinity which implies the following claim: (CSD) All sane cognizers know that 
God exists. [argue that externalism about knowledge comports well with claim 
CSD, and I explore various questions about the character of the theistic belief 
implied by CSD. For example, I argue that CSD implies that all sane cognizers pos-
sess functionally rational theistic belief. In the final sections of the paper, I respond 
to two main objections and argue that CSD is consistent with the existence of vari-
ous kinds of atheists and agnostics. 
According to John Calvin, human beings naturally possess a "sense of divini-
ty" -i.e., they naturally possess some awareness of God. This paper explores a 
robust interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity, according to 
which any sane cognizer knows that God exists. This interpretation is robust in 
at least two respects. First, with respect to the level of awareness, this interpre-
tation asserts that the sense of divinity yields knowledge of God, as opposed to 
yielding mere justified or rational belief in God. Second, with respect to the 
scope of awareness, this interpretation asserts that knowledge of God is nearly 
universal among human cognizers. In this paper, I articulate and explore this 
interpretation, and then defend it against two main objections. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section one, I highlight three main 
features of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity and formulate the robust 
interpretation. In section two, I briefly characterize the externalist approach 
to knowledge, and explain why it comports well with Calvin's doctrine. 
Section three is a discussion of four questions: 1. Does Calvin's doctrine of 
the sense of divinity entail that sane cognizers have basic theistic belief? 2. 
Does it entail the existence of a successful natural theology? 3. Does it entail 
that sane cognizers have rational theistic belief? 4. Does it entail that there is 
no evidence against theism? Sections four and five deal with two objections 
that might be raised against CSD. Section four considers the claim that CSD 
is objectionable because it precludes the existence of atheists. Finally, section 
five considers the claim that CSD is objectionable because it precludes the 
existence of agnostics. 
1. Calvin's Doctrine of the Sense of Divinity 
The essence of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity is that God 
has naturally implanted in each human being a "sense of divinity" or 
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"seed of religion": "There is within the human mind, and indeed by nat-
ural instinct, an awareness of divinity." (1.3.1., 43)' By virtue of this 
sense of divinity, human beings naturally possess a kind of knowledge 
of God. I will now highlight three features of Calvin's doctrine of the 
sense of divinity. 
1. Although the sense of divinity provides some kind of knowledge of 
God, it does not provide knowledge of God in what I shall call the strict 
or proper sense. On Calvin's understanding, knowledge of God in the 
strict or proper sense involves more than a mere cognitive grasp of the 
proposition that God exists-it also essentially involves grasping how 
one ought to be situated as a creature with respect to this God: 
Now, the knowledge of God, as I understand it, is that by which 
we not only conceive that there is a God but also grasp what befits 
us and is proper to his glory, in fine, what it is to our advantage to 
know of him. Indeed, we shall not say that, properly speaking, 
God is known where there is no religion or piety. (1.2.1.,39). 
The point to be emphasized here is that Calvin's concept of knowledge 
of God in the strict or proper sense is a religiously rich concept. For the 
possession of knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense entails the 
practice of piety. McNeill comments that "It is a favorite emphasis in 
Calvin that pietas, piety, in which reverence and love of God are joined, 
is prerequisite to any true knowledge of God." (39) 
Under the fall, the sense of divinity does not provide us with knowl-
edge of God in the strict or proper sense. Calvin indicates that if Adam 
had not fallen, then humans would naturally possess knowledge of God 
in the strict or proper sense: "the very order of nature would have led us 
[to this knowledge] if Adam had remained upright." (1.2.1.,40) 
2. Although the sense of divinity does not (under the fall) provide 
knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense, Calvin holds that it does 
provide what I shall call bare knowledge that God exists. In my usage, to 
say that a person possesses bare knowledge of God is precisely to say 
that he or she knows that the proposition God exists is true. I am calling 
this "bare knowledge" in order to sharply differentiate it from what we 
have been calling "knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense." 
Possessing knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense entails pos-
sessing bare knowledge of God, but the converse is not true. 
The heading of book I chapter 3 is "The Knowledge of God Has Been 
Naturally Implanted in the Minds of Men." And Calvin makes it clear 
that the sense of divinity provides this bare knowledge of God even 
under the fall: 
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an 
awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To 
prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, 
God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of 
his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he repeatedly 
sheds fresh drops. Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that 
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there is a God and that he is their Maker, they are condemned by 
their own testimony because they have failed to honor him and to 
consecrate their lives to his will. [emphasis mine] (1.3.1,43-44) 
It is evident from the last sentence of this passage that the sense of divin-
ity provides knowledge of God's existence even under the fall-for 
those who perceive that there is a God are condemned by their failure to 
honor Him.' 
3. Although the sense of divinity does provide the bare knowledge that 
God exists, Calvin is very emphatic that under the fall, the sense of divini-
ty is compatible with all sorts of superstition and rebellion against God. 
(Note that this is a consequence of the first point discussed above, that the 
sense of divinity under the fall fails to provide knowledge of God in the 
strict or proper sense.) This is the main theme of chapter four of book one, 
which is headed "This knowledge [provided by the sense of divinity] is 
either smothered or corrupted, partly by ignorance, partly by malice." In 
this chapter, Calvin stresses that as a consequence of the fall, people natu-
rally respond to bare knowledge of God in an inappropriate manner: 
Experience teaches that the seed of religion has been divinely plant-
ed in all men. But barely one man in a hundred can be found who 
nourishes in his own heart what he has conceived; and not even one 
in whom it matures, much less bears fruit in its season [d. Ps. 1:3]. 
Now some lose themselves in their own superstition, while others 
of their own evil intention revolt from God, yet all fall away from 
true knowledge of him. As a result, no real piety remains in the 
world. But as to my statement that some erroneously slip into 
superstition, I do not mean by this that their ingenuousness should 
free them from blame. For the blindness under which they labor is 
almost always mixed with proud vanity and obstinacy. (1.4.1,47) 
It is clear then that while knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense 
entails pious living, bare knowledge of God does not. 
Having briefly reviewed some of the main features of Calvin's doc-
trine of the sense of divinity, I now turn to formulating what 1 take to be 
a central implication of Calvin's doctrine. We have seen that according 
to Calvin, "men one and all perceive that there is a God." (1.3.1, 43-44) 
Therefore, I think the following is a reasonable starting point: 
(1) For any human being S, S knows that God exists. 
Perhaps someone might object against (1) that Calvin means to claim 
only that all mature or adult human beings perceive that there is a God. 
However, I think this is mistaken, since Calvin writes that: "it [the sense 
of divinity] is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one 
of which each of us is master from his mother's womb and which nature 
itself permits no one to forget, although many strive with every nerve to 
that end." (1.3.1,46) Nevertheless, I think that it is appropriate to qualify 
(1) for the following reason. Even if Calvin means to assert that human 
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beings possess knowledge of God at birth or at some stage prior to birth, 
it does not follow that he also means to assert that human beings possess 
knowledge of God at even earlier stages of existence. Consider a human 
zygote. If, as I believe, a human zygote is a human being, then (1) 
implies that this zygote possesses propositional knowledge that God 
exists. But we do not know that a human zygote even has the capacity to 
have propositional knowledge. Therefore, I believe it is reasonable to 
amend (1) as follows: 
(1 *) For any human being S, if S has any propositional knowledge 
at time t, then S knows at t that God exists. 
If we let the term "cognizer" mean "human being who has some proposi-
tional knowledge," then (1 *) is equivalent to the claim that all cognizers 
know that God exists. This claim allows for the possibility that there are 
some human beings who, perhaps because they are at very early stages 
of existence, are not yet cognizers.! But I believe we ought to add one 
more qualification to (1 *). I think it is reasonable to qualify (1 *) to allow 
for the possibility that someone who is insane or suffers from severe 
brain damage might have some propositional knowledge but neverthe-
less lack knowledge that God exists. Here I propose to use the term 
"sane" to mean something like "someone who is neither insane nor suf-
fers from severe brain damage." So we can now amend (1 *) as follows: 
(CSD) For any sane human being 5, if 5 has any propositional knowledge 
at t, then 5 knows at t that God exists." 
Given our terminology, (CSD) can also be expressed as the claim that for 
any sane cognizer S, S knows that God exists. Given the standard 
assumption that knowledge entails belief, CSD implies that all sane cog-
nizers are theists. s Of course, CSD implies neither that every sane cog-
nizer is a self-conscious theist (i.e., someone who is aware of their belief 
that God exists) nor a professing theist (i.e., someone who professes or 
claims before others belief that God exists). In the final sections of this 
paper, we will consider the question of whether CSD is consistent with 
the existence of sane cognizers who are either atheists or agnostics. 
2. The Significance of Externalism for C5D 
In this section, I want to explain why the externalist approach to 
knowledge is relevant to our discussion of Calvin's doctrine of the sense 
of divinity. In order to explain the externalist approach to knowledge, it 
is first necessary to explain internalism about warrant, where warrant is 
that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true 
belie£.6 An internalist approach to knowledge is one which places one or 
more internalist constraints on warrant.' Now rather than attempting to 
give a general characterization of just what counts as an internalist con-
straint (a task that might involve considerable difficulty), I will provide 
a few paradigm examples of internalist constraints: 
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a. 5 is warranted in believing that p only if 5 can tell just by reflec-
tion that S is violating no epistemic duties in believing that p. 
b. S is warranted in believing that p only if S can tell just by reflec-
tion that S has adequate reasons for believing that p. 
c. S is warranted in believing that that p only if S has adequate rea-
sons for believing that p. 
The externalist approach to knowledge is simply the denial of internal-
ism; externalism imposes no internalist constraints on warrant. Here 
then are some examples of externalist theories of knowledge: 
a. Skp (i.e., S knows that p) iff S believes p because p is true (causal 
theory). 
b. Skp iff S's belief p is true and reliably produced (reliabilism). 
c. Skp iff S's belief p is true and produced by properly functioning 
cognitive faculties (abbreviated statement of Plantinga's warrant 
theory). 
The causal and reliabilist theories were both proposed by Alvin 
Goldman.8 While it is generally acknowledged that the causal theory suf-
fers from serious difficulties, it is arguable that reliabilism is the dominant 
theory of knowledge in contemporary epistemology. However, Alvin 
Plantinga has argued that reliabilism is inadequate, and that his warrant 
theory is a superior alternative to reliabilism.9 But the point I want to 
stress here is that on each of these three theories, it is in general possible for 
a person to possess knowledge without satisfying any internalist con-
straints. For example, on a simple reliabilist theory of knowledge, it is 
quite possible for me to know that it is 80 degrees outside, even if I cannot 
tell just by reflection that I have adequate reasons for believing this. 
There are at least two potentially attractive features of externalist 
approaches to knowledge. First, externalism appears to provide simple 
solutions to some traditional epistemological problems. For example, 
philosophers have grappled with the problem of whether beliefs formed 
on the basis of induction have positive epistemic status. Reliabilist 
externalism provides a simple and reassuring solution to this problem: if 
true beliefs based on induction are formed in a sufficiently reliable fash-
ion, then they count as knowledge-problem solved! Second, because 
externalism imposes no internalist constraints on warrant, it makes 
knowledge more accessible to infants, young children, and animals. For 
satisfaction of the internalist constraints often requires that the cognizer 
possess well-developed cognitive faculties and perhaps even concepts 
such as that of epistemically justified belief. This general point carries 
implications for our discussion of knowledge of God. If there are no 
internalist constraints on warranted belief in God, then knowledge of 
God also becomes more widely accessible.lO Thus, Alston has claimed 
that on a relatively externalist approach to knowledge, "it is quite possi-
ble that knowledge of God extends more widely than many of us sus-
pect."" Alston's point suggests that the externalist approach to knowl-
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edge should be attractive to the defender of CSD. Therefore, throughout 
the rest of this paper, I shall adopt the externalist approach to knowl-
edge as a working hypothesis. Hence, the remainder of the paper will 
explore the implications of (CSD) on an externalist reading.12 
3. Exploring Some Implications of CSD 
In this section, we will discuss four questions, each of which explores 
implications of CSD. These questions are: 1. Does CSD entail that sane 
cognizers hold basic theistic belief?, 2. Does CSD entail the existence of a 
successful natural theology?, 3. Does CSD entail that sane cognizers hold 
rational theistic belief?, and finally, 4. Does CSD entail that there is no 
evidence against theism? 
1. We noted above that given the standard assumption that knowl-
edge entails belief, CSD implies that every sane cognizer holds theistic 
belief. It is then natural to inquire into the character of this theistic 
belief. First then, does CSD entail basic theistic belief-i.e., belief (that 
God exists) not based on propositional evidence? 
In general, externalism allows that knowledge can be realized in 
either basic or nonbasic belief. However, it is significant that CSD 
entails that every sane cognizer acquires knowledge of God at the incep-
tion of propositional cognition. Because of this, I think it reasonable to 
suppose that this early knowledge of God is realized in basic belief. 
Therefore, CSD suggests that it is typical or normal for sane cognizers to 
hold basic theistic belief, especially at earlier stages of cognition. But it 
may also be the case in the development of some sane cognizers that 
basic theistic belief eventually comes to be replaced by nonbasic theistic 
belief. And nothing in CSD precludes some sane cognizers from know-
ing that God exists by holding nonbasic theistic belief. '3 
2. Does C5D entail that the classical arguments for the existence of God 
are successful? No, because externalism implies that there can be knowl-
edge of God, even if none of the classical theistic arguments is successful. 
Alston and Plantinga have argued persuasively that our beliefs about 
external objects may be warranted, even if there are no good arguments 
from sensory experience to the existence of external objects. 14 And 
Plantinga has argued that one can be warranted in believing that there are 
other minds, even if none of the traditional "other minds" arguments is 
successful.15 Given Plantinga's theory of warrant, if 5's (true) belief that 
"There are other minds" is an instance of proper cognitive function (and 
the other relevant conditions are met), then 5 knows that there other minds. 
The same point goes for belief in God. Suppose that none of the tradi-
tional theistic arguments is successful. Nevertheless, if 5's belief that 
God exists is both true and reliably produced, then Alston's RTB view 
(i.e., the view that knowledge is reliably formed true belief) implies that 
it is knowledge. 1" Or, if 5's belief that God exists is both true and an 
instance of proper cognitive function (accompanied by the other rele-
vant conditions), then Plantinga's warrant theory implies that 5 knows 
that God exists.17 So the externalist approach implies that CSD does /lot 
entail a successful natural theology. 
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3. Our third question is: does CSD entail that sane cognizers hold 
rational theistic belief? But recent epistemological discussion of the con-
cept of rationality shows that this is not a simple question. In Warrant: 
The Current Debate, Plantinga identifies four different concepts of ratio-
nality.1R Therefore, we will consider four different versions of the origi-
nal question "Does CSD entail rational theistic belief?," where each ver-
sion corresponds to a concept of rationality identified by Plantinga. 
a. Aristotelian Rationality. Here rationality is not a property of beliefs, 
but a property of a creature, or perhaps a kind of creature (as in "human 
beings are rational beings"). Plantinga points out that being a rational 
creature is a necessary condition for the possession of knowledge. 
Hence, this concept of rationality entails that any cognizer (i.e., a human 
being who knows something) is a rational creature. So it obviously fol-
lows that anyone who knows that God exists is a rational creature. 
b. Deliverance of Reason Rationality. On this concept, S's believing 
that p is rational just in case p, the proposition believed, is a "deliverance 
of reason," where this means that p is either self-evident (i.e., such that 
one cannot grasp the proposition without seeing that it is necessarily true) 
or is deducible from self-evident propositions by means of self-evidently 
valid inferences. So, whether CSD entails rational theistic belief in this 
sense depends on whether CSD entails that the proposition "God exists" 
is a deliverance of reason in this narrow sense. But for all I know, CSD 
neither entails (nor precludes) that "God exists" is a deliverance of 
reason1 " Therefore, for all I know, CSD does not entail rational theistic 
belief in this sense. But it is important to note here that even if theistic 
belief is not rational in this sense, it does not thereby follow that it is irra-
tional. For given this concept of rationality, it is in general quite possible 
that S's belief that p is neither rational nor irrationaL''' And it is important 
to recognize the point emphasized by Plantinga that many paradigmati-
cally rational beliefs are not rational in this "deliverance of reason" sense. 
c. Evidentialist Deontological Rationality. On the concept of deonto-
logical rationality, according to Plantinga, S's believing that p is rational 
just in case S's believing that p violates no epistemic duties. And accord-
ing to evidentialist philosophers, one is permitted to believe a proposi-
tion only if the proposition either satisfies the conditions for proper basi-
cality (e.g., by being self-evident or about one's own mental states) or 
one has propositional evidence in support of that proposition. 
Therefore, according to this evidentialist account, S's belief that p is 
deontologically rational only if p is properly basic for S or S has proposi-
tional evidence that p.21 
I think that on this evidentialist account of deontological rationality, 
CSD does not entail that sane cognizers possess (deontologically) rational 
theistic belief. For externalism straightforwardly implies that S can know 
that p even if p does not satisfy the evidentialist conception of proper 
basicality and S also lacks propositional evidence that p. But it is impor-
tant to again note Plantinga's point that many paradigmatically rational 
beliefs are not deontologically rational on the evidentialist account.22 
I have claimed that CSD on our externalist reading allows for the pos-
sibility that a cognizer S can know that God exists, even if S possesses no 
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propositional evidence that God exists. In other words, CSD does not 
entail that every sane cognizer possesses propositional evidence that 
God exists. But here is a separate question: does CSD perhaps entail that 
at least some sane cognizer (somewhere) possesses evidence that God 
exists? In a pair of very interesting articles, Steve Wykstra has drawn 
attention to precisely this question: does knowledge of God entail that 
someone (somewhere) has evidence for the existence of God? Wykstra 
expresses some sympathy for an affirmative answer to this question. 
According to the view which he calls warrant evidentialism, a person S 
knows that God exists only if there is at least some theistic evidence (i.e., 
propositional evidence that God exists) which is available to S's epis-
temic community. Warrant basicalism, on the other hand, holds that S 
can know that God exists, even if there is no theistic evidence available 
to S's epistemic community. While it may be that CSD is strictly consis-
tent with warrant evidentialism, it probably comports much better with 
warrant basicalism. The model suggested by warrant evidentialism sug-
gests that knowledge is transmitted from those who possess evidence to 
members of the community who do not, and this in turn suggests that 
there would probably be some degree of failure to transmit the knowl-
edge to all members of the community. CSD, on the other hand, entails 
that each sane cognizer has the knowledge in question.23 
d. Rationality as Proper Function. I noted above that there are beliefs 
(e.g., the belief that there is a tree before me) which are paradigms of 
rational belief, and yet these beliefs do not qualify as deliverances of rea-
son, nor are they rational in the deontological sense. This suggests that 
there must be some other central concept of rationality. 
Plantinga suggests there is a concept of rationality according to which 
a particular piece or segment of cognitive functioning is rational just in 
case it is proper cognitive functioning: "Here 'rationality' means absence 
of dysfunction, disorder, impairment, pathology with respect to cogni-
tive faculties."24 According to this concept, there are various cognitive 
activities which can be rational or irrational: believing a proposition, 
believing a proposition with a particular degree of firmness or strength, 
withholding belief in a proposition, making an inference, etc. Thus we 
can say that S's believing that p is functionally rational just in case S's 
believing that p is an instance of proper cognitive function. And more 
generally, any piece x of S's cognitive functioning is functionally rational 
just in case x is an instance of proper cognitive function. 
In conjunction with Plantinga's overall theory of warrant, CSD entails 
that each sane cognizer does exhibit functionally rational theistic belief. 
This is because according to Plantinga's theory, proper cognitive function 
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for warrant, which is, in turn, 
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of knowledge. However, even 
if Plantinga's overall theory of warrant is incorrect, so long as proper cog-
nitive function is a necessary condition on knowledge, then functional 
rationality is a necessary condition on knowledge, so that CSD entails 
. that sane cognizers possess functionally rational theistic belief. Although 
philosophers such as Hasker and Alston have challenged the claim that 
proper cognitive function is required for knowledge, I find this claim 
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plausible, and therefore I also find it plausible that CSD entails that each 
sane cognizer believes that God exists and holds this belief in a function-
ally rational manner.25 
4. Our fourth and final question in this section is: does CSD entail that 
no sane cognizer possesses evidence against theism? Plantinga has pre-
sented a "disappearing letter case" which is relevant to this question. 
Here is the case: 
I am applying to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a 
fellowship; I write a letter to a colleague, trying to bribe him to write 
the Endowment a glowing letter on my behalf; he indignantly refuses 
and sends the letter to my chairman. The letter disappears from the 
chairman's office under mysterious circumstances. I have a motive 
for stealing it; I have the opportunity to do so; and I have been known 
to do such things in the past. Furthermore, an extremely reliable 
member of the department claims to have seen me furtively entering 
the chairman's office at about the time when the letter must have been 
stolen. The evidence against me is very strong; my colleagues 
reproach me for such underhanded behavior and treat me with evi-
dent distaste. The facts of the matter, however, are that I didn't steal 
the letter and in fact spent the entire afternoon in question on a soli-
tary walk in the woods; furthermore I clearly remember spending that 
afternoon walking in the woods. Hence, I believe in the basic way 
(13) I was alone in the woods all that afternoon, and I did not steal 
the letter. 
But I do have strong evidence for the denial of (13). For I have the 
same evidence as everyone else that I was in the chairman's office 
and took the letter; and this evidence is sufficient to convince my 
colleagues (who are eminently fairminded and initially well dis-
posed towards me) of my guilt.26 
Plantinga thinks it is obvious that S is rational to continue believing he 
did not steal the letter, in spite of the propositional evidence to the con-
trary. Thus Plantinga takes this case to show that: It is possible that S's 
belief that p is rational even though S has strong propositional evidence 
that not-po Now Planting a does not go so far as to suggest that the sub-
ject in this case might know that p ("I did not steal the letter") in spite of 
the strong counterevidence, but I think it is plausible that the case can be 
altered slightly to support the following principle: It is possible for S to 
know that p, even though S has (some) propositional evidence that not-
p. Let us weaken the counterevidence somewhat by supposing that it is 
not the case that S has been known to do such things in the past; then I 
think it becomes plausible that S might know that he did not steal the let-
ter, even though S has some propositional evidence that he did (for S 
believes that an extremely reliable member of the department claims 
that S stole the letter). The above principle <that knowledge is compati-
ble with propositional counterevidence), which I believe is quite plausi-
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ble, suggests that C5D is consistent with the claim that some sane cog-
nizers have (some) propositional evidence against theism. I should per-
haps make it clear that I am not endorsing the claim that anyone actually 
has propositional evidence against theism. T do not think this claim is 
obviously true. All I am suggesting is that C5D may well be consistent 
with propositional evidence against theism. Of course, it is quite clear 
that C5D is also consistent with the claim that no sane cognizer has 
propositional evidence against theism. 
4. The First Objection: CSD Precludes Atheism 
Thus far, we have explored my interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of 
the sense of divinity (C5D) and seen that on this interpretation, C5D 
entails that every sane cognizer is a theist. In the remaining sections of 
the paper, I will defend this interpretation against two objections: 1. C5D 
is objectionable because it is inconsistent with the existence of atheists, 
and 2. C5D is objectionable because it is inconsistent with the existence 
of agnostics. 
The first objection runs as follows: if CSD is true, it follows that there 
are no sane cognizers who atheists. But it is obvious that there are sane 
cognizers who are atheists; hence C5D is false. I will consider two dif-
ferent versions of this objection. The first version claims that it is impos-
sible for someone to hold contradictory beliefs, and therefore (given that 
propositional knowledge entails belief) CSD precludes anyone from 
believing the contradictory of "God exists." The second version con-
cedes the possibility of holding contradictory beliefs, but it claims that 
whenever a person 5 believes a pair of contradictory propositions, then 
it is not the case that 5 knows either of these propositions. 
We will begin with the first version. If it is impossible to hold contra-
dictory beliefs, then (given that propositional knowledge entails belief) 
C5D precludes sane cognizers from believing that God does not exist-
i.e., C5D precludes atheism. 
50 is it possible for a person to simultaneously hold contradictory 
beliefs?27 (For convenience, I will omit the qualifier "simultaneously" 
throughout the remainder of this discussion-so it should be under-
stood as implicit.) More precisely, the question we are discussing here is 
whether it is possible for someone to believe a proposition p, and at the 
same time also believe the contradictory of that proposition-viz., not-po 
50 we are not discussing the distinct question of whether a person can 
believe a self-contradictory proposition of the form (p and not-p). Nor 
are we discussing the distinct question of whether a person can simulta-
neously believe propositions which are inconsistent with each other (I 
think it is uncontroversial that this is unfortunately quite possible). 
Let's start with this question: is it possible for a person to occurently 
hold contradictory beliefs? Let us say that S occurently believes p at t just 
in case S believes p and S is (consciously) thinking that p at t. (And we can 
say that S dispositionally (or non-occurently) believes p at t just in case S 
believes p but is not (consciously) thinking that p at t.) 50 a question which 
arises here is whether it is possible for someone to think that p and at the 
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very same time to think that not-p? I submit that this seems impossible 
to me, in nearly the same way that it seems impossible to me that some-
one could think that (p and not-p) at some time. So I will not defend the 
claim that a person might occurently hold contradictory beliefs. 
Is it then possible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs, where at 
least one member of the pair is held non-occurently (or dispositionally), 
and where both members of the pair are ordinary beliefs? (Let us say, 
following Richard Foley, that an ordinary belief is just a belief which is 
neither repressed nor unconscious. We will bring non-ordinary beliefs 
into the discussion a bit later.) 
In an article entitled "Is It Possible to Have Contradictory Beliefs?," 
Richard Foley has defended the claim that it is impossible for a person to 
hold contradictory beliefs, when both members of the pair are ordinary 
beliefs.28 For convenience, I will refer to this as the impossibility thesis. 
Foley defends the impossibility thesis by arguing for the following claim, 
which I shall just refer to as Foley's premise: For any putative case of contra-
dictory (ordinary) beliefs, that case can be given a plausible explanation as a case 
where the person does not genuinely hold contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. (For 
convenience, let's call an explanation which implies that the person does 
not genuinely hold contradictory ordinary beliefs a "non-genuine expla-
nation.") Foley explains six different strategies for providing non-gen-
uine explanations for any putative case of contradictory (ordinary) 
beliefs. For example, the case may be explained by supposing that the 
person holds inconsistent but not contradictory beliefs, or that the person 
holds contradictory beliefs but not simultaneously, or that the person 
holds contradictory beliefs but one member is a non-ordinary belief. 
My evaluation is that Foley'S defense of the impossibility thesis is 
rather weak. First, it is unclear to me that Foley adequately supports his 
premise that any putative case of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs can be 
given a plausible non-genuine explanation. For it is unclear that Foley 
considers all of the relevant kinds of cases-e.g., Foley does not consider 
any putative cases of self-deception, where it might be thought that 
these cases cannot be given plausible non-genuine explanations. But the 
main point I want to make is this: even if Foley's premise is true, it does 
not follow that it is impossible for someone to hold contradictory (ordi-
nary) beliefs. Foley's premise only entails that if there are any genuine 
cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs, then those cases can be given a 
plausible (but false) explanation as non-genuine. 
Foley'S premise does not entail the impossibility thesis. Indeed, his 
premise does not even entail the much weaker thesis (i.e., weaker rela-
tive to the impossibility thesis) that it is always rationally preferable to 
explain any putative case of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs as non-gen-
uine. Note that Foley'S premise is perfectly consistent with each of the 
following claims: 
A. There are some putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs 
such that these cases can be given a plausible explanation as a case 
where the person genuinely holds contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. 
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B. There are some putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs 
such that the most plausible explanation is that the person genuinely 
holds contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. 
Given Foley's premise, if either A or B is true, then it follows that there 
are putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs which are suscepti-
ble of explanations, where these explanations are inconsistent with each 
other but both are plausible. If A is true, then there may be cases where 
it is not rationally preferable to explain them as non-genuine, since the 
genuine explanation may be just as plausible as the non-genuine expla-
nation. And if B is true, then there are cases where (i) the non-genuine 
explanation is not rationally preferable, and (ii) the genuine explanation 
is the rationally preferable explanation. 50 even if Foley has succeeded 
in establishing his premise (and it is unclear to me that he has succeeded 
even in this), he has not provided strong reason to believe that it is 
impossible for someone to hold contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. 
I have argued that Foley's argument fails to warrant us in believing 
that it is impossible for a person to hold contradictory ordinary beliefs. 
To conclude this section, I will argue that even if Foley's impossibility 
thesis turns out to be true, there are at least two other relevant possibili-
ties which should be considered. 
First, it is important that so far we have been restricting our focus to 
consideration of cases where both members of the pair are ordinary 
beliefs. And even if these ordinary-belief cases are impossible, it still 
might be possible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs where at 
least one member of the pair is a nOll-ordinary belief-i.e., a belief which 
is unconscious or repressed. Foley explicitly limits his argument to 
showing that it is impossible to hold contradictory ordinary beliefs-he 
states explicitly that he does not want to argue that it is impossible to 
have contradictory beliefs where at least one member of the pair is a 
non-ordinary belief,29 
5econd, let's suppose for the sake of argument that it is flat-out impos-
sible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs, regardless of whether one 
member of the pair is a non-ordinary belief. At this point I think it is 
important to consider a distinction drawn by some philosophers between 
belief and acceptance. This distinction has been discussed by Plantinga 
and Lehrer, and developed in impressive detail by L. Jonathan Cohen.'" I 
will explain this distinction by following Cohen's account. 
According to Cohen, for 5 to believe that p is for 5 to be disposed 
such that whenever 5 considers p 5 normally feels it true that p. On the 
other hand, for 5 to accept that p is for 5 to have chosen a policy of using 
p as a premise in 5's reasoning and decision-making. Because of these 
differences, belief and acceptance are logically independent in that one 
can believe a proposition not accepted, and one can accept a proposition 
not believed. For example, although the moral skeptic may not accept 
the proposition Some actions are right and others wrong, she may nonethe-
less find herself compelled to believe this proposition. And although 
she may accept the proposition No actions are either right or wrong, she 
may be humanly unable to believe this proposition. Cohen argues that 
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while belief is involuntary (although we can do things which influence 
what beliefs we hold), acceptance is fully voluntary-we choose or 
decide what propositions we will accept. 
The point I want to highlight here is that it is possible for a person to 
believe that p while simultaneously accepting that not-po Cohen claims 
that this is what is going on in self-deception. If Cohen is correct, then it 
may also be possible for a person who believes that God exists to simulta-
neously accept that God does not exist. That is, it is possible that some 
people might be disposed to normally feel it true that God exists whenev-
er they consider the matter, while they also have a policy of using the 
proposition God does not exist as a premise in their reasoning and decision-
making. 50 even if holding contradictory beliefs is flat-out impossible, if 
Cohen's account of self-deception is correct, then C5D does not preclude 
the existence of atheists-i.e., provided that the definition of atheism is 
broadened so that atheistic acceptance is a sufficient condition for atheism. 
Let me conclude our discussion of the first version of this objection by 
summarizing its results: 1. I have argued that Foley's discussion does 
not adequately support the thesis that it is impossible for a person to 
hold contradictory ordinary beliefs. 2. I have noted that even someone 
like Foley (who defends the impossibility thesis) allows room for the 
possibility that holding contradictory beliefs is possible when at least 
one member of the pair is a non-ordinary belief. And 3. I have suggest-
ed that even if it is flat-out impossible for a person to hold contradictory 
beliefs, the putative distinction between belief and acceptance makes rel-
evant Cohen's claim that a person can believe that p while simultane-
ously accepting that not-po Given these results, I conclude that we are 
not warranted in claiming that C5D precludes atheism. 
We will now consider the second version of the objection that CSD 
precludes atheism. This objection concedes the possibility of holding 
contradictory beliefs, but claims that whenever a person 5 believes a pair 
of contradictory propositions, then it is not the case that S knows either of 
these propositions. For if S believes the proposition not-p, then S has a 
rebutting defeater for the proposition p, and this precludes SIS knowing 
that p (since propositional knowledge requires the absence of a defeater). 
I shall make three points in response to this objection. First, this 
objection fails if a hardcore externalist account of knowledge is correct. 
For on this sort of account, if S's (true) belief that p is produced by a reli-
able belief-forming process, then S has knowledge that p, regardless of 
whether SIS belief that p is irrational due to the presence of a rebutting 
defeater.31 Therefore, even if it is a true principle that S has a rebutting 
defeater for p whenever S believes not-p, this does not preclude a situa-
tion where S believes that not-p and yet knows that p. 
Second, this objection succeeds only if S has an undefeated rebutting 
defeater for p whenever S believes that not-po To clarify this point, it 
will be helpful to briefly discuss the nature of defeaters.32 In general, a 
defeater is a reason for withholding belief in a proposition, so that S has 
a defeater for p just in case S has a reason to withhold belief that p. If I 
believe that (F) Feike cannot swim, and 1 then learn that Feike is a lifeguard, 
I have acquired a rebutting defeater for (F). But defeaters can them-
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selves be defeated. If I later learn that Feike is a Frisian lifeguard and 99 
out of 100 Frisian lifeguards cannot swim, then my original defeater for (F) 
has been defeated, and it is rational for me to believe (F) Feike cannot 
swim. If S has an undefeated defeater for p (i.e., a defeater for p which is 
not itself defeated) but nevertheless believes p, then S's belief that p is 
irrational. Two kinds of defeaters have been identified in the literature: 
S has a rebutting defeater for p where S has a reason for thinking that p is 
false, and S has an underclltting defeater for p where S has something 
which undermines the adequacy or reliability of S's reason(s) for think-
ing that p is true. We can now return to the objection that if S is an athe-
ist, then S has an undefeated rebutting defeater for theism so that S can-
not know that God exists. 
The objection is successful only upon the assumption that whenever a 
person S believes a proposition not-p, then it is also the case that S has 
an undefeated rebutting defeater for p. But this principle seems false. 
Suppose that Norman just finds himself with the belief that (not-w) The 
President is not in the White House, although Norman has nothing that 
would normally be regarded as evidence that the President is not in the 
White House. (We may suppose that Norman's belief that not-w is pro-
duced by a reliable but fallible power of clairvoyance.) And suppose 
that Norman in fact has strong evidence for the proposition that (w) The 
President is in the White House. (Suppose Norman is sitting in a room 
in the White House, witnessing the President give a news conference.) 
Is this a situation where Norman has an undefeated rebutting defeater 
for the proposition that w? I suggest that if Norman does possess a 
rebutting defeater for w (just by virtue of the fact that he believes that 
not-w), then this defeater is itself defeated (by Norman's strong evi-
dence for w), so that it is not the case that Norman has an undefeated 
defeater for w. Thus, at least as far as defeaters are concerned, there is 
nothing to preclude Norman from knowing that (w) The President is in 
the White House (in spite of the fact that he also believes the contradic-
tory of this proposition). Thus, even if it is true that S has a rebutting 
defeater for p whenever S believes not-p, it appears false that S has an 
undefeated rebutting defeater for p whenever S believes not-p.33 
Finally, it is also important to mention cases of self-deception, where it 
seems that a person knows that p is true, even while he or she (somehow) 
believes the proposition not-po If, as some philosophers claim, there are 
genuine cases of this sort (not necessarily involving theistic and atheistic 
belief), then the objection is mistaken (since these are cases where S 
believes that not-p while knowing that p).34 I conclude that this second ver-
sion of the objection also fails to preclude the possibility that a sane cogniz-
er who is an atheist might nevertheless possess knowledge that God exists. 
5. The Second Objection: CSD Precludes Agnosticism 
The second objection runs as follows: if CSD is true, it follows that 
. there are no agnostics. But it is obvious that there are agnostics; hence 
CSD is false. 
r will begin my response to this objection by distinguishing four dif-
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ferent kinds of agnosticism. First, S is a doxastic agnostic just in case S is 
neither a theist nor an atheist (i.e., S does not believe the proposition 
"God exists," nor does S believe the proposition "God does not exist"). 
Second, S is a professing agnostic just in case S claims and/ or believes 
that S is neither a theist nor an atheist (in other words, S claims and/or 
believes that S is a doxastic agnostic). Third, S is a classical agnostic just 
in case S believes that neither theism nor atheism can be rationally justi-
fied or warranted.35 And finally, S is an acceptance agnostic just in case S 
accepts neither theism nor atheism. 
Now it is obvious that there are professing agnostics in the world, but 
this fact is perfectly consistent with the truth of CSD. For it is possible 
that all sane cognizers who are professing agnostics are actually theists 
who mistakenly (even if sincerely) believe that they are neither theists 
nor atheists. Perhaps it is also obvious that there are classical agnostics 
in the world, but this too is consistent with CSD. For a sane cognizer 
who believes that neither theism nor atheism can be rationally justified 
might nevertheless believe the proposition "God exists." And it is clear 
from our discussion of belief and acceptance that CSD is consistent with 
the existence of acceptance agnostics. Thus, CSD is only inconsistent 
with the existence of doxastic agnostics. But I question whether it is 
obvious that there are doxastic agnostics. Certainly, the claim that there 
are doxastic agnostics is not nearly as obvious as the claim that there are 
professing agnostics, and therefore I think this is by no means a decisive 
objection against CSD. 
6. Conclusion 
I will conclude by briefly summarizing what I take to be the most sig-
nificant results of our discussion. First, we have seen that CSD suggests 
that sane cognizers typically possess basic theistic belief, especially at 
early stages of cognitive development. And while CSD does not entail 
the existence of a successful natural theology, nor does it preclude the 
existence of evidence against theism, it is plausible that CSD entails that 
each sane cognizer is functionally rational in holding theistic belief. 
Finally, I have argued that even though it entails that every sane cogniz-
er is a theist, CSD is consistent with the existence of various kinds of 
atheists and agnostics.3n 
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